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Abstract. While a useful source of repeatable security knowledge, ambiguity
about what security patterns are and how they might be applied call into question
their reliability as a design tool. To provoke discussion about their usefulness,
this paper claims that security patterns should be considered harmful because
(i) they abdicate design responsibility, (ii) their implications are unclear, and (iii)
abstractions are still an enemy. We also consider Strong Concepts as a more useful
alternative for security design.
1 Motivation
Security patterns describe particular, recurring security problems arising in specific con-
texts, and present a well-proven generic solution for them [1]. By breaking security
problems into smaller pieces, security patterns make design complexity easy to man-
age. However, Schumacher et al’s definition for a security pattern is framed in terms of
what it does, rather than what it is. At the panel at Cyberpatterns 2012, panelists were
asked to define a security pattern. In general, the panelists agreed that patterns are an
abstraction of the repetitive, they need to tell their user something interesting, and they
need to be analysed in order to determine if they are applicable or not. Yet, panelists
also defined security patterns differently, based on their particular cybersecurity stake.
While most would agree that security patterns can be useful as a source of repeatable
knowledge, we claim that they should also be considered harmful for security design.
After all, if a panel of experts are unable to agree on what security patterns are, and how
they should be used, why should we expect others to adopt them?
2 Why are Security Patterns harmful?
Our argument that security patterns might be considered harmful runs as follows:
– Security patterns abdictate design responsibility: In general, patterns abdicate re-
sponsibility to practitioners for understanding both their problem and its context
well enough to understand the implications of a security pattern. Because they ap-
pear to satisfy relevant requirements, architects may succumb to the temptation of
selecting patterns at an early stages of system design, when the context remains
unclear. This can have unexpected consequences.
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– The implications of security pattern application are unclear: The consequence of
pattern application is an important element in the original Gang of Four patterns [2].
Yet, not all security pattern templates consider the implications of pattern applica-
tion; when they do, useful dimensions of their application are omitted. For example,
Lobato et al’s [3] privacy policy patterns consider their consequences only in terms
of user comprehension and confidence; privacy is, however, a much more nuanced
value and privacy design implications are much broader.
– Abstractions are still an enemy: In their response to Wing’s work on the merits of
computational thinking [4], Blackwell et al. [5] claim that abstractions have po-
tentially harmful side-effects because dehumanising complexity leads to problems
re-establishing their human impact when these are contextualised. This claim ap-
pears to hold true for patterns as well as abstractions, particularly where patterns
rely on organisational abstractions that are more rigid that computational forms.
3 Strong Concepts as an alternative to security patterns
Some in the HCI community have criticised patterns for being tied to interfaces rather
than actual design practice. From a security design perspective, this may also be the
case. As a result, Strong Concepts [6] have been proposed as an alternative. Strong
concepts, such as social navigation and seamfulness are softer than design patterns
while still affording a useful design vocabulary; they also afford evaluation criteria that
experienced designers can adopt. As such, many incomplete security patterns in the
wild might be more usefully employed as strong concepts to provide better heuristics
for security designers.
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